Neurobiological data & Husserlian constitution - II
The alternative solution: according priority to intentionality
One approach to consciousness as act is a strictly correlational approach, one
which refuses to separate the subjective and the objective pole of the experiences
under consideration (perception, action, memory, imagination). This is
the only way to avoid playing Cartesian games, alternatively extroverted and
introverted, extroverted in the forgetfulness that objects are there for someone
and introverted in the failure to recognise the essential nature of repre-
sentations whose very existence is dependent upon their reference to external
things. The real problem is not that of knowing when and how the threshold of
consciousness is crossed as soon as otherwise more decisive events are produced
outside of it (Locke’s inner chamber). The true problem is to know how a world
invested with meaning unfolds within the field of vision of an inhabitant of this
world, how things emerge, become available for handling, how their alterations
satisfy (or frustrate) his motor intentions, etc. We need a theory about the way
in which a perceiving agent makes sense of what does not in itself make sense.
Both access and non-access to things stem from the fact that things are so constituted
in their very being that they can be meaningful for us.
Starting with intentionality, the paradox of an external thing already constituted
prior to its being encountered is eliminated in principle. It ceases to
be a purely contingent event in the experience of a subject, something which
nevertheless (and despite the manifest contradiction) had to be able to gain access
to the interior of this subject and be received there. No longer mutually
indifferent, but just the reverse, mutually sustaining, subject and object are henceforward
reduced to opposed poles, each referring to the other in a circular and
dynamic relation without which neither could be maintained. The cogito is an
act which posits the object as one and the same. Each object thereby becomes
a meaningful objective, a unifying pole, the guarantee of our expectations.
The viability of this alternative approach depends upon the fact that one is
able to suspend the mutual indifference of subject and object and to relativise
their difference in the context of each conscious experience and within the
continual flux out of which these experiences emerge. The substitution for the
subject-object duality of a noesis-noema correlation (Ideen I) gives expression
to this ambition (Husserl 1976). The noesis is the subjective activity which
traverses, animates and unifies the one with the other by linking together the
multiple configurations stemming from the sensorial field within which a
possible something is outlined in the course of experience. The noema is neither
consciousness itself nor the object. As the unifying pole of the noetic
synthesis in the absence of which it would be dissipated in the pursuit of the
multiple, it cuts across the indefinite multiplicity of the process by offering a
determinate segment: the object just as it is in its mode of givenness.
Intentionality in the constitution of the thing
What is decisive is that the noema confers its constituting character upon the
lived duration. The result is neither a sterile succession nor yet a compressed
accumulation but a regular development of meaning. Tied down to the process
by which it is formed rather than being fixed in the in-itself of an Idea, the
noema retains the virtual flexibility of alternative possibilities of development
at each phase of experience. But if one goes so far as to reduce the nucleus of
intentionality to its constituting noesis has one not subordinated objectivity
to subjectivity, the esse to the percipi?
The incarnation of meaning in the concrete development of corporeal experience
is secured by the promotion of the kinesthetic function to the status
of the constitutional operator.2 In this regard, however, a process is required
in order that the kinesthesia be invested with intentionality. In the first place,
a meaning which only floated on the horizon line of gaze has to be contextually
integrated into the movements of the body. The arrow of intentional consciousness
traverses and links up instantaneous cross sections of the visual
field in accordance with the movements I make in exploring the visual scene.
Not only does it connect the finite series consisting of what is actually visible
in the form of ever changing images, this finite series gets extended into the
infinite series of other changes made possible by the trajectory adopted by the
same action. But if this consciousness is capable of grasping the thing itself
across the adumbrations through which it is present, this is only because each
adumbration refers to the next, and because the movements of the body
brings the very adumbration which satisfies this intention of unity and identity
(Husserl 1973b, IV, pp. 154–203). If the visual field at some later moment
outlined a scene which could not have been foreshadowed at an earlier moment,
the consciousness of unity would collapse. Visual images only acquire
the status of adumbrations, are only capable of sustaining intentionality, in
circumstances where the kinesthesia develop normally.
The contribution of kinesthetic sensations to the constitution of the visual
thing is however limited to varying the visual scene and placing it in perspective,
as though the scenario was under the direction of an act of apprehension
projecting the thing across its adumbrations. The sensations which alert me
to the movements of my perceptual organs do not in themselves secure this
projective exposition of the thing. My freedom of movement, the effort required
to move my body, the tiredness that comes from expending muscular
energy, none of this makes it possible for kinesthetic sensations to endow parts
of space with qualities or to bring these parts of space together into fields, all
of which remains the task of visual and tactile sensations. From gesture to
gesture, what could possibly be implied by kinesthesia if not a continuing
alternation of tension and relaxation whose continuity does not even require
that any one phase be intentionally referred to any other? Wholly engaged in
the direction of visual attention, such intentionality emanates exclusively from
the subject.
Intentionality in the constitution of one’s own body
The concept of kinesthesia relies upon the duality from whence it springs, the
“I move” considered either from the proprioceptive (sensorial) or from the
practical (voluntary) standpoint. In the constitution of the physical thing, the
proprioceptive path is privileged. Its role is to separate out the changes due to
the movements of the thing from the changes attributable to the movements
of the subject. Whether the latter are voluntary or passive, the variation produced
in the visual field is always the same: a new series of lateral aspects of
the object is unfolded in perspective. In the constitution of the body as one’s
own, on the other hand, the duality of the kinesthesia is brought into play.
Kinesthetic sensations of movement and position are what make possible the
localisation of tactile qualities and their unification in a continuous surface
which enfolds the hand touched by a constant referral from place to place of
the touching hand. An experience intrinsic to my motor intentions even before
the sensorial impact, this is what they amount to at each reversal of the
touching-touched relation in the course of which I appropriate my physical
body constituted in this way as that body which I can move when I will. Here
we find the co-ordination of the two hands, a coordination which I bring about
at will but which can not be brought about by kinesthesia directed toward the
placing in perspective of the visual thing. Not because these kinesthesia are
devoid of intentionality but because the polarisation of visual perception means
that one’s own body, the nul point of any orientation, loses itself in the outward
thrust toward the goal of action.
The radicality of the kinesthetic constitution of one’s own body has much
less to do with imprinting its natural anatomy upon a sensorial configuration
than with what is brought about by the realisation of our motor intentions. Two
kinesthetic systems have to be distinguished.3 A first system is devoted to
orientation in perspective; it contains all those objects whose aspects vary from
the remote horizon to the immediate availability of things within reach. The
other system seems at first to be concentrated upon an unextended point, the
point of origin of the axes of co-ordination of the perceived world. The experience
of the tool, as a “non-kinesthetic extension of one’s own body,” recommends
its reinterpretation as a system functioning in equilibrium with the
first system. In fact, any object I lay hold of, which I pick up and take with
me or which I make use of (Heidegger’s hammer) is immediately withdrawn
by me from its primary condition of an object of visual constitution to be incorporated
into my sphere of ownness as the vector of my intentions, woven
into the kinesthetic system, whether explicitly or implicitly, by the practical
handling of things encountered in the world. Nothing brings out more clearly
9 RECENT NEUROBIOLOGICAL DATA AND THE HUSSERLIAN THEORY
the variability of the corporeal horizon than the possibility of replacing the
earth as the immobile point of reference of all perceived movements by a plane
or space craft.
Intentionality in intersubjective constitution
The systematic exploitation of the resources of kinesthetic functions in constitutive
operations does not lead to an indefinite stratification of the layers
of meaning. On the contrary, a certain dialectical closure of the field of referential
possibilities blocks this progression: constitution of the thing – constitution
of one’s own body – constitution of an intersubjective world. In fact, it
makes perfectly good sense to say that, for us, the meaning of this world requires
that it be populated with physical things and that we are not alone in
living in the midst of such things. The different ontological regions of experience
thereby evoked (things, the self, others) are, one by one, brought into
play in a movement first of projection, then of introjection and finally of
analogical transfer. The eidetic structure of intentionality closes this movement.
Goal-oriented intentionality profers things, self-referential intentionality
profers one’s own body. What might be called transferential intentionality
or empathy (Einfühlung) founds the openness to the other of one’s own experience
by supplementing one’s own kinesthetic system with the possibility of
its resonating with that of someone else, attested and confirmed through the
perception of the physical movements (expressive of the other’s active intentions)
of another agent.
For Lipps, Einfühlung was a way of gaining direct access to the interior
life of the other (Lipps 1903a, 1903b, II, pp. 97–223). Only later do we come
to separate this life of the other from our own subjective life. For Husserl, what
particularly distinguishes the perception of the other is the absence of any direct
experience of his mentality (Husserl 1973a, T3, Bl. IX, X, XVI). With regard
to the other, as with regard to any physical thing, only a part is directly given:
his body from the front. But a more complete experience of the other would
also have to comprise those parts which are not given, which are prefigured
as accessible in the further course of experience: his back and sides. In addition,
we see his body as his own body, the bearer of sensorial fields and
kinesthetic systems but we do not perceive the red he sees nor do we feel his
activity. When we see other human bodies, impressions of movement can be
associated with this sight through empathy. But they refer us on to an experience
of “I feel, I move my body” which is not itself given. We know that there
is on that side a new sensorial field, another freedom which is not anchored
in our own self-apperception. As soon as we integrate, within the horizon of
our perception of the other, the empathic quasi-givenness of his kinesthesia
and his subjective life, both of which are always suggested without actually
being given, then, instead of a cognitive deficiency in the perception of the
other, we find ourselves equipped with an (super-sensible) historical and
hermeneutical understanding of intersubjectivity.